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For the evaluation and design of transport pricing strategies, it is impor-
tant to have insight into the behavioral responses induced by transport
pricing. Relevant dimensions of behavior include trip suppression,
mode choice, and departure time choice. The results from a question-
naire among Dutch car owners are presented. The behavioral responses
to two Dutch policy-relevant road pricing measures were analyzed.
Depending on the type of measure, reductions of 6% to 15% were found
in the number of car trips, which is in line with previous findings. A flat
kilometer charge affects social trips considerably more than commuting
trips. Respondents do appear to adjust commuting trips when a peak
hour charge is implemented. Nonmotorized travel and trip suppression
are the most popular alternatives for noncommuting trips. Departure
time changes become attractive for all purposes when the proposed mea-
sure varies over time. Important explanatory variables for these effec-
tiveness levels include the type of measure, income, and the possibility
for commuters to work at home.
People’s responses to transport pricing are not straightforward.
Price increases may induce modelers not to travel anymore or to
change their modal use or departure time, depending on the type of
measure. A wide variety of transport pricing measures exists, hav-
ing different consequences for travel behavior. Price measures are
seen as one of the major tools for policy makers to influence trans-
port development. The design of measures will generally depend on
the objectives set by the government. It is therefore important for
authorities to have clear insight into the responses induced by trans-
port pricing. This response will depend, to a considerable extent,
on the exact design of the pricing scheme (e.g., a yearly tax on car
ownership can be expected to affect kilometrage of a given vehicle
relatively weakly, compared with a kilometer charge). Equally impor-
tant, however, is the price sensitivity of transport users for the various
relevant types of behavior that together define transport behavior.
Such dimensions of behavior may include, for instance, trip sup-
pression, mode choice, and route choice. People have various pos-
sibilities to change transport behavior and can be expected to react
differently to different pricing schemes.
This paper presents the empirical results from a survey among
Dutch car owners toward the behavioral effects of various policy-
relevant, road pricing measures. Two types of measures have been
evaluated by the respondents. The short-term behavioral responses
will be analyzed for sensitivity and type of change for three trip
purposes. Furthermore, the aim is to find explanatory variables for
the self-reported level of effectiveness (expressed as the share of
trips that will be changed).
This paper is organized as follows. The following section gives an
overview of previous literature results. The next section explains the
structure of the questionnaire and the type of pricing measures that
have been evaluated by the respondents. The next section presents
the effectiveness outcomes, in terms of car trips that will be replaced
(and how these trips will be changed). A statistical analysis is con-
ducted in the following section, which identifies important explana-
tory variables for the level of effectiveness of each type of measure.
The final section presents conclusions.
ROAD TRANSPORT PRICING 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES
Transport users will respond differently to various pricing policies.
The possible behavioral responses to pricing include, among others,
trip suppression (travel frequency choice), departure time choice (and
rescheduling of daily activities), route choice, and mode choice.
Depending on the desired aim, policy makers decide to make use of
a particular price instrument that is likely to steer travel behavior in
a more desired direction. However, the eventual effect of a price
change depends on various factors, which makes the predictability of
the effects from a certain measure rather difficult. Factors affecting
price sensitivity include (1)
• Type of price change. The types of pricing measures can have
different effects on travel behavior.
• Type of trip and modeler. Commute trips tend to be less elastic
than shopping or recreational trips.
• Quality and price of alternative routes, modes, and destina-
tions. Price sensitivity tends to increase if alternative routes, modes,
and destinations are of good quality and affordable (for example,
road users tend to be more price sensitive if there is a parallel untolled
roadway).
• Time period. Transportation elasticities tend to increase over
time as consumers have more opportunities to take prices into effect
when making long-term decisions (2).
• Large and cumulative price changes. Extra care should be used
when calculating the impacts of large price changes or when sum-
ming the effects of multiple changes, because each subsequent
change affects a different base.
A substantial body of economic literature analyzes the effects of
transport pricing measures on particular types of behavior. Elastici-
ties, for example, have been widely studied. Most of these studies
have looked at the effect of fuel prices on car stock, fuel consumption
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and car use. Goodwin (3), for instance, finds a long-run price elas-
ticity of kilometers driven with respect to fuel price of –0.33; in the
short-run this is –0.16. Despite the fact that road pricing is not widely
implemented, practical experiences provide valuable results on
effectiveness. Singapore, for instance, has experience since 1975,
and results show that traffic is quite sensitive to the road pricing sys-
tem even though the charges are relatively low (4). The study sug-
gests that time-of-day charging may lead to considerable departure
time and mode choice effects, but much depends on local situations
(e.g., public transport availability).
This study focuses on one particular type of price measure, which
is policy relevant in the Netherlands—the implementation of a kilo-
meter charge and simultaneous abolition of existing fixed car taxa-
tion (this measure is often called variabilization). Current fixed car
taxation has two main components in the Netherlands: a tax on car
ownership (to be paid yearly, the MRB) and a tax to be paid when
purchasing a new car (the BPM). A brief discussion of some previous
literature results on this type of measure follows.
One of the first studies of the mobility effects of variabilization
was conducted by MuConsult in 1998 (5). A simulation model was
used to study the effects of different kilometer charges with the
restriction that the revenues for the government remain constant
(fixed car taxation was lowered or abolished). The study shows that,
depending on the level of the charge, implementation may lead to a
considerable reduction in total kilometers driven. A kilometer charge
of 7 (euro) cents, for instance, leads to a total reduction of 19% of
vehicle kilometers driven. Business travel is least affected (7%),
whereas social travel (23%) and commuting (19%) are most sensi-
tive. Most of these car kilometers are replaced by bicycle use and
carpooling. Effects are less strong when the charge is lower. A
charge of 3 (euro) cents is estimated to reduce commuting by 5%
and social travel by 8%. A remarkable prediction of this study is the
decrease in car ownership (for all scenarios considered). Appar-
ently, the effect of the increase in the variable charge dominates the
effect of lower ownership costs.
A stated-preference survey among car owners as well as non-car
owners reported in MuConsult (6) also analyzed the behavioral
responses to different types of kilometer charging with abolition of
fixed taxes, either of MRB only, or of both the MRB and the BPM.
The charges were differentiated according to fuel type. The MRB-
only scenario included a charge of 2.4 (euro) cents per kilometer for
petrol-using cars (and slightly higher charges for cars running on
diesel and gas). The MRB+BPM scenario contained a charge of
4.9 (euro) cents with equal levels for other fuel types. In contrast
to the previous study, this study predicts an increase in car owner-
ship levels for all alternatives considered. The predicted car stock
shows a stronger growth under the MRB-only scenario than in the
MRB+BPM scenario (2.8% versus 1.2%). The higher charges in
this latter scenario induce relatively more car owners (4.6% versus
1.3%) to sell their car. The results in terms of vehicle kilometers
indicate a small reduction for the MRB-only scenario of about
0.9% and a somewhat larger effect of 3.4% for the other scenario.
These effects include a decrease in kilometers by car owners and
an increase of kilometers driven by respondents who intend to pur-
chase a new car (estimated around 2% for both scenarios). Espe-
cially social, shopping, and recreational trips will be adjusted,
whereas business travel and kilometers driven for school or edu-
cational purposes remain almost unchanged. Commuting trips will
be changed (about 30% of the respondents intended to reduce their
number of kilometers driven for this purpose) but less often than
the social and shopping trips.
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Recently, initiated by a request from the Dutch Minister to search
for a new, widely approved, pricing regime, the effects of various
road pricing alternatives have been estimated with the national net-
work model for the Netherlands (Landelijk Model Systeem,LMS)
(7). Among the 10 alternatives that have been evaluated were four
variabilization measures. When all fixed taxes are replaced by a
kilometer charge (with budget neutrality for the government), the
model predicts a decrease in car use (in terms of kilometers) of 11%
(compared with the reference situation in 2020). The average charge
per kilometer causing these effects was about 5.7 (euro) cents and
depended on fuel type and weight of the car. The growth in conges-
tion will be reduced by 40% (in terms of vehicle hours lost). People
will change mode (use of train, bus/metro, and nonmotorized trans-
port increases by 6%), and especially social travel (29%) and to a
lesser extent commuting (9%) will be reduced.
Another considered alternative included variabilization of all car
ownership taxes (MRB) plus only one-quarter of the car purchase
taxes (BPM). The average kilometer charge is consequently lower
[3.4 (euro) cents] than the previous measure, but an additional charge
of 0.11(euro) cents was levied on locations and times with severe
congestion. The LMS model outcomes suggest that congestion will
be reduced by about 45%. Trip distances will decrease. This effect
is small for commuting trips but larger for social trips. Business
travel (6%) and freight traffic (1%) are predicted to increase, but
total travel demand will decrease (by 10%) due to considerably less
commuting (16%) and social kilometers (25%).
DATA COLLECTION AND SURVEY DESCRIPTION
Data Collection
The data for this study were obtained from an (interactive) Inter-
net survey among Dutch car owners. The total sample consists of
562 respondents. These respondents were presented with two road
pricing measures and were asked if and how they expect to change
their behavior when facing these measures. The focus here is on the
short-term responses. The data were collected during 3 weeks in
February 2005.
Survey
Two pricing measures will be considered in this paper, each in mul-
tiple alternatives. Table 1 shows these six alternatives for both mea-
sures. The alternatives were divided randomly among the respondents,
and each respondent evaluated one alternative of each measure. This
means that at least 88 observations were obtained for each alternative
of both measures.
All descriptions of the measures, as shown to the respondents,
consisted of two major components: (a) an explanation of both the
structure and the level of the charge and the allocation of the revenues
and (b) an estimation, provided to each respondent individually, of
the financial consequences of the implementation of the proposed
measure with unadapted behavior (on the basis of self-reported travel
behavior and car ownership). This estimation depends on the charge
level (costs) and on the type of revenue use (benefits). Information
on the annual number of kilometers driven and time of driving
(Measure 2) is the input for the cost estimation. The financial bene-
fits shown to the respondent depend on the type of revenue use.
Because it was impossible to give respondents a personal estimation
of the financial benefits involved with a recycling via lower-income
taxation, the savings for those measures were presented only when
existing car taxes are abolished. The benefits from paying less car
taxation depend on the type of car the respondent owns (i.e., fuel
type and weight). Averages were estimated for nine categories (a
combination of three fuel types and three weight categories) for an
abolition of MRB only and an abolition of all existing car taxation.
Some practical issues also were explained, which were meant to
prevent various practical considerations from affecting the responses.
In particular, the respondents were to assume that the privacy of car
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users is guaranteed, electronic equipment registers the toll, and the
driver can choose freely the payment method (e.g., credit card, bank
transfer, etc.).
The survey started with some general questions asking for impor-
tant background variables of the respondent. These variables may
help explain the differences in self-reported effectiveness levels.
The variables included in the statistical analyses are explained in
more detail in Table 2, showing the profile of the sample.
TABLE 1 Description of the Road Pricing Measures Presented to Respondents
Measure Alternatives
1: flat kilometer charge with different revenue 
allocations
2: peak and off-peak kilometer charge and 
different revenue allocations
6 = euro
A: 3 6 cent, revenues used to abolish car ownership taxes (MRB)
B: 6 6 cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation (purchase (BPM) and ownership (MRB)
C: 12 6 cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation and construct new roads
D: 3 6 cent, revenues used to lower income taxes
E: 6 6 cent, revenues used to lower income taxes
F: 12 6 cent, revenues used to lower income taxes
A: 2 6 cent outside peak times and 6 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
abolition of car ownership taxes (MRB)
B: 4 6 cent outside peak times and 12 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
abolition of existing car taxation (BPM and MRB)
C: 8 6 cent outside peak times and 24 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
abolition of existing car taxation and new roads
D: 2 6 cent outside peak times and 6 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
revenues used to lower income taxes
E: 4 6 cent outside peak times and 12 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
revenues to lower income taxes
F: 8 6 cent outside peak times and 24 6 cent in peak on working days (7.00–9.00 and 17.00–19.00), 
revenues used to lower income taxes





Weekly number of times in congestion
Employed
Trip purpose (effect of measure on type of
car trip) (for N = 1370)
Type of measure (charge)
Type of measure (revenue use)
Possibility to work at home (available for 
employed people making a commuting trip
by car at least once a week)
Yearly number of kilometers driven
Compensation of costs by employer (available
for employed people making a commuting 















Male (61.2%), female (38.8%)
Inc1: less than 628,500 (21.4%), Inc2: 628,500–45,000 (31.5%), Inc3: 645,000–68,000
(28.5%), Inc4: more than 668,000 (15.7%), Inc5: do not know or won’t say (3.0%)
Employed (82.7%); not employed (17.3%)
Dummy commuting (29%), dummy visiting (33%), dummy other (38%)
Dummy charge 3 6 cent (measure 1)
Dummy charge 6 6 cent (measure 1)
Dummy charge 12 6 cent (measure 1)
Dummy peak charge 6 6 cent (measure 2)
Dummy peak charge 12 6 cent (measure 2)
Dummy peak charge 24 6 cent (measure 2)
Dummy road taxes [revenues are used to lower existing road taxes (1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) and
construct new roads (1C and 2C)]
Dummy income taxes (revenues are used to lower income taxes, measures 1D to 1F and
2D to 2F)
Working home1: possible to work at home (26%), Working home2: not
possible (42.2%), Working home3: unknown (31.8%)
Comp1: none (11.4%), comp2: partly (32.2%), comp3: completely (19.9%), comp4: have
no commuting costs (4.8%), comp5: unknown (31.8%)
Yes (one or more) (45.7%); No (54.3%)
Statistics on the profile of Dutch car owners are unfortunately not
available. A review of some statistics gives a first impression on rep-
resentativeness. The educational level of the sample appears rela-
tively high. About 29% of the Dutch car owners have a bachelor’s
or master’s degree (this is based on the authors’ calculations of data
for 2003). The share is considerably higher in this survey (40%).
Younger people appear to be overrepresented in the survey. About
30% of the car owners in the Netherlands are older than 55, while
this share is only 16% in this survey.
The question of whether respondents have the possibility of
working at home may have an impact on the effectiveness of a road
pricing measure, and it has been included in the analysis. About 26%
of the respondents have the possibility of working often or always
at home. Respondents who do not make commuting kilometers by
car or do not have a job have not answered this question (about 32%
of the sample). The respondents were also asked if they receive
compensation for their commuting costs from their employer. Most
car owners are at least partly compensated. A small group incurs no
commuting costs. This may be people having their work at home,
but it also may include respondents who misinterpreted the question
and in fact are completely compensated by their employer (these per-
sons indicated that they do commute partly or wholly by car). The
respondent was not informed about how employers will compensate
for modeling costs after pricing is implemented.
After a concise description of each measure, the respondents were
asked whether they would change the number of car trips for three
different trip purposes (only when the respondent indicates that he or
she actually makes this type of trip):
• Commuting trips (made at least sometimes by 70.8% of the
respondents),
• Trips to visit people (made at least sometimes by 80.1% of the
respondents), and
• Other types of trips (e.g., shopping, sports activities, made at
least sometimes by 92.9% of the respondents).
If respondents indicated that they indeed expect to adjust their
travel behavior, they were next asked to indicate the share of trips that
will be changed and also how the trips will be changed. It was possi-
ble for people to indicate that they would make more car trips. In that
case, they were asked only how many extra trips they would make.
Depending on the type of measure and trip, various possibilities were
presented:
• Public transport,
• Nonmotorized travel (walking, bicycle),
• Motorized private transport (motorbike, motor),
• Carpool (only asked for commuting trips),
• Work at home (only asked for commuting trips),
• Travel at other times (only when measure is time dependent), and
• Give up the trip.
To analyze the behavioral responses to the proposed pricing mea-
sure in a quantitative way, the respondents were asked to indicate
for each purpose how many trips they make in a normal week.
Because some types of trips are made only once a week, the respon-
dents were asked to indicate how many trips they will change in a
period of 4 weeks (presenting their total number of trips made for
each purpose). Hence, a respondent indicating that he or she makes
five commuting trips a week could change 20 trips at most. Next it
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was asked how these trips will be changed. Respondents could not
continue with the survey when the number of trips to be changed
was unequal to the sum of numbers allocated to various alternatives.
EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT 
PRICING REGIMES
The aim now is to analyze the behavioral responses to the various
pricing measures. This section focuses on the sensitivity and type of
effect of the short-term responses to two different measures for three
different trip purposes [i.e., commuting, social travel (visits), and
other (e.g., shopping)]. With survey information on the behavioral
responses (number of trips that an individual will adjust and how
these will be adjusted) and an individual estimation of the yearly
number of kilometers driven for each trip purpose, it is also possible
to express changes in terms of kilometers.
Measure 1. Flat Kilometer Charge [3, 6, and 12
(euro) cents] and Different Types of Revenue Use
The percentage of respondents who indicated they would adjust
their car trips when Measure 1 became reality were 11% for com-
muting, 26% for visits, and 24% for other trip purposes. After
these adjustments by numbers of trips made and by the length of
these trips were weighed, these figures can be transformed into
changes in numbers of trips and vehicle kilometers. Table 3
shows the aggregated outcomes for all alternatives of Measure 1
together.
The numbers vary considerably over the various trip purposes.
The proposed kilometer charge is relatively most effective for
trips made to visit people, and least so for commuting trips. This
may be explained by the fact that a trip suppression is no alter-
native for commuting trips: only 0.5% of trips to be adjusted would
not be made anymore. For other reasons, people consider the
alternative of not making the trip more often. Popular alternatives
(for all purposes) for car trips include nonmotorized transport and
public transport. Cycling and walking in particular are alterna-
tives for visits and other trips; apparently these trips are often of
short distance. The effectiveness as shown by adjusted number 
of kilometers is less than for numbers of trips, probably because
people driving relatively fewer kilometers more easily adjust their
behavior.
It is also interesting to consider the relative effectiveness of the
various alternatives of Measure 1. A kilometer charge of 12 (euro)
cents tends to have more effect than a similar measure with lower
charges. The lower panel of Table 3 shows the impact of each
alternative for the various trip purposes. Some results are different
than expected: a measure with a higher charge is not always more
effective. For instance, Measure 1D [with a charge of 3 (euro) cents]
appears slightly more effective than Measure 1E [6 (euro) cents]
for particular trip purposes. Measure 1F induces the strongest trip
changes. Alternatives A, B, and C are variabilization measures,
and these appear to be less effective than the measures in which
revenues are used to lower income taxes. The perceived higher
costs for each individual involved with the latter measures, stem-
ming from the inability to predict the reduction in income tax,
may form an explanation for this. If so, the bias results from the
design of the questionnaire. None of the 96 respondents who eval-
uated Measure 1A (with the low toll) indicated that he or she would
change commuting trips.
Measure 2. Peak–Off-Peak Kilometer 
Charge with Different Revenue Use
The second measure is a kilometer charge differentiated crudely
according to time (peak and off-peak only), with different rev-
enue use allocations. Compared with the previous measure, this
measure is, in terms of total number of adjusted trips (for all pur-
poses), more effective (14.1% versus 9.7%). This measure has
relatively more impact on commuting trips. The number of com-
muting trips changed is 1,004—14.8% of the total trips made for
commuting reasons, considerably more than 5.9%. Almost half of
the trips that will be adjusted will be replaced by trips made off-
peak (see Table 4). Nonmotorized travel is also an attractive alter-
native, but again only for noncommuting purposes. The motor or
motorbike is not a serious alternative for the respondents, and the
same holds for carpooling.
The pattern shown in the lower part of Table 4 is somewhat differ-
ent from what could be expected. This measure combines different
charge levels with different types of revenue use. Alternatives C
and F have the highest charges, considerably higher than A and D.
The estimated benefits of revenue use for Alternatives A to C have
been presented to the respondents, but this has not been done for the
alternatives in which revenues are used to lower income taxes (D to F).
Since higher charges tend to have more effect, Alternatives C and F
may be expected to have more effect than the other alternatives,
and B and E again more than A and D. This is not entirely true.
Measure 2B, for instance, is considerably less effective than Mea-
sure 2A for all purposes. A similar pattern is found for Measure 2E,
compared with 2D. Most remarkable is that the alternatives with
the lowest charge levels (A and D) are even more effective than
Alternatives C and F for certain purposes. The findings for the impact
of revenue use (abolition of car taxation versus income tax reduc-
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tions) are, for most trip purposes, equal to the results for Measure 1:
variabilization is said to be less effective. Only the outcomes for
Measures 2C (visits) and 2A (other purposes) are different in this
context, and revenues hypothesized to reduce car taxation dominate
income tax compensation in terms of effectiveness. The impact of
the type of measure (distinction between revenue use and charge
level) will be analyzed in a more detailed way by conducting a
statistical analysis in the next section.
When the effects of the measure for trip purposes are examined,
it appears that Measure 2C has more effect on social visiting trips
than on trips for other purposes. The reverse holds for the same pur-
pose for Measure 2F. Measure 2D tends to be less effective for other
trips, while Measure 2A appears most effective for this type of trip.
There appears to be not much difference between trip purposes for
the other measures.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The aim of this section is to find and interpret factors that have an
impact on the level of effectiveness. Socioeconomic characteristics of
the respondents, type of measure evaluated, and other information
available (answers to other questions) will be linked to the trip changes
reported by the respondents. The methodology is explained first.
Methodology
The methodology to be applied is motivated by the structure of the
data. The aim is to explain the level of self-reported effectiveness
for the various measures. The dependent variable is the fraction of
the total trips made during 4 weeks that will be adjusted as indicated
by the respondents, that is, a number between zero (no change) and
one (all car trips will be adjusted). This information is available for
TABLE 3 Aggregated Outcomes of Behavioral Responses to Measure 1 (Flat Kilometer Charge)
Including Effectiveness of Each Alternative
Commuting Visits Other
Total Number of Trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780
Number of trips adjusted 400 (5.9%) 513 (14.2%) 846 (10.9%)
Public transport 31.8% 17.8% 13.3%
Nonmotorized travel 32.2% 44.6% 64.9%
Motorized 9.5% 8.9% 1.8%
Carpool 19.5% Not relevant Not relevant
Working at home 6.5% Not relevant Not relevant
Not making trip 0.5% 28.6% 19.9%
Number of
% of Total Trips Adjusted
Respondents Commuting Visits Other
Measure 1A 96 0 9.5 13.6
Measure 1B 94 5.0 9.4 9.5
Measure 1C 88 11.3 20.3 17.6
Measure 1D 101 25.0 15.0 21.2
Measure 1E 91 19.7 20.5 16.7
Measure 1F 92 39.0 25.3 21.5
Kilometers adjusted (in % of total) 3.9% 11.6% 9.2%
all three distinguished trip purposes. Only those respondents who
actually make more than one trip per week for a particular type of
trip purpose have been included in the data set. This reduces the
data set to 398 respondents who make commuting trips, 450 who
make social trips (visits), and 522 respondents who use the car to
go shopping or to participate in sports.
The dependent variable is not of an ordinary type. Because most
of the people indicate no change in behavior, the effectiveness vari-
able is often a zero. This has consequences for the applied method-
ology. To increase the number of observations, it was decided to
pool the three (for each purpose) observations but to keep the data
for both measures separated. This pooled data set contains 1,370
observations. This increases the sample size for each measure, while
it is still possible to correct for different trip purposes.
The structure of the dependent variable is such that a standard type
of regression analysis (assuming a normal distribution of the error
term) is not applicable, due to the large number of zero-value obser-
vations. Censored regression models, in which the dependent vari-
able is observed in only some of the ranges, is more appropriate.
Tobin (8) analyzed this problem and formulated a regression model
that was later called the Tobit model. This model is defined as follows
when censoring takes places at zero, as in this case (9, p. 151):
where
yi = the effect of the measure (the fraction of trips changed) as
reported by individual i;
xi = a set of explanatory variables;
β′ = a vector of coefficients to be estimated; and
ui = residuals that are independently and normally distributed,
with mean zero and a common variance.
y
x u x u
i
i i i i=
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This implies that yi is considered as the observed realization of
an underlying latent variable that describes the intention of a respon-
dent to change behavior. When this intention is positive, the observed
variable is equated to the latent variable. When the latent variable
is zero or smaller than zero, the measurement variable equals
zero, thus yi = 0. An upper limit of 1 was imposed to the dependent
variable, since all values of the dependent variable are between
zero and one. The computer program Limdep was used to obtain
the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter values for the
explanatory variables.
Various specifications of the model for all measures (by includ-
ing variables that may be expected to have some explanatory power)
have been tried, and the preferred specifications of the Tobit analy-
ses are presented. The results presented are the marginal effects on
the observed effectiveness. These coefficients can be interpreted
more easily than the standard output of the maximum likelihood
estimates which relate to the latent variable. The estimations for both
measures have been done with the same explanatory variables (except
for the “type of measure” variable) to maximize comparability
between the models.
Measure 1. Flat Kilometer Charge [3, 6, and 12
(euro) cents] and Different Types of Revenue Use
Table 5 presents the estimation results for Measure 1. The data set
contains 1,081 zero observations, leaving 289 observations of changed
behavior. The first column of Table 5 presents all explanatory variables
that have been included in the estimation. It appears that the type of
measure (split into charge level and type of revenue use) has a sig-
nificant impact on the individual effectiveness scores. As expected,
the measures with lower charge levels [3 and 6 (euro) cents com-
pared with 12 (euro) cents] are in general less effective. Variabiliza-
tion appears less effective than use of revenues to lower income taxes.
This can be explained by the fact that with the latter types of 
TABLE 4 Aggregated Outcomes of Behavioral Responses to Measure 2 (Peak and Off-Peak Kilometer
Charge) Including Effectiveness of Each Alternative
Commuting Visits Other
Total Number of Trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780
Number of trips adjusted 1004 (14.8%) 529 (14.6%) 1028 (13.2%)
Public transport 17.6% 13.6% 14.1%
Nonmotorized travel 12.7% 28% 28.9%
Motorized 8.8% 1.7% 1.5%
Carpool 4.5% Not relevant Not relevant
Travel at other times 47.7% 47.8% 47.3%
Working at home 7.9% Not relevant Not relevant
Not making trip 0.6% 8.9% 8.3%
Number of
% of Total Trips Adjusted
Respondents Commuting Visits Other
Measure 2A 96 16.0 14.2 21.6
Measure 2B 91 13.8 10.0 12.1
Measure 2C 97 15.8 25.9 13.1
Measure 2D 96 19.0 18.9 14.4
Measure 2E 94 13.9 14.4 15.7
Measure 2F 88 21.3 16.6 23.2
Kilometers adjusted (in % of total) 14.6% 13.2% 11.2%
measures only the extra costs of the charge were presented to the
respondent (it was not possible to present a realistic estimation of the
benefits of lower income taxes). The purpose of the trips affects the
level of effectiveness. The findings presented in the previous section
on pricing effectiveness are here confirmed in terms of marginal
effects, in the sense that commuting trips changed less strongly than
“other” and “visiting” trips.
A dummy for working respondents is included. Working respon-
dents do not appear to respond differently from nonworking respon-
dents. Within the group of employed people driving from home to
work, it does make a difference whether one has the opportunity to
work at home on certain days. This group is more flexible and hence
tends to change behavior sooner than others not having this possi-
bility. Respondents driving to work (at least once a week) who
obtain a partial compensation for their costs tend to change behav-
ior sooner than other drivers. This result may have been anticipated
for the first group, assuming that employers will also refuse com-
pensation in the new situation. One explanation might be that com-
pensation is in many cases rather modest or those respondents fear
that the employer will not compensate costs in the new situation.
Respondents in the highest income category tend to be less price
sensitive, and this is also what is found here. People without chil-
dren are also less inclined to change behavior. Other types of trips
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(among which is bringing children to school) are more often
changed, which may be one of the reasons. Other variables, such as
age, car usage (yearly number of kilometers), frequency of facing
congestion, gender (not included), or education (not included and
correlated with income) do not appear to have an important impact
on the level of self-reported effectiveness.
Measure 2. Peak–Off-Peak Kilometer Charge
with Different Revenue Use
The second measure analyzed consists of a kilometer charge with an
additional coarse peak charge during peak hours. The alternatives dif-
fer in charge levels and type of revenue use. In the section on pricing
effectiveness, it was concluded that the impact of the type of mea-
sure on the level of effectiveness was not entirely clear. The outcomes
in Table 6 confirm this pattern. The level of the charge is significant
only for the difference between a peak charge of 12 and 24 (euro) cents,
while the type of revenue use is not significant at all. The individual
costs and the benefits, however, were presented differently to the
respondents than with Measure 1. The difference is that here the level
of the charge depends on the time of driving. And since information
was not available on the number of kilometers driven during these peak
periods, it was decided to present both extremes to each respondent
(costs when all or no kilometers are driven during peak hours). While
the off-peak charges are lower than with Measure 1, the peak charges
are considerably higher. The benefits from lower car taxation may be
perceived by the respondents as being rather low, which may explain
the relatively stronger effectiveness levels for this measure for the first
three alternatives. This then may also be an explanation for the
insignificance of revenue use here.
In contrast with the previous measure, being employed makes a dif-
ference. Employed respondents (not necessarily making a commut-
ing trip by car) appear to be less tempted to change behavior in general
(for all types of trips). Another new factor is the importance of the
number of times during a week that people usually face congestion.
This measure leads to more trip adjustments among car drivers who
regularly drive in congestion. The structure of the measure, mainly
affecting peak hour drivers (when congestion is usually most severe),
is the most likely reason for this. Similar to the previous measure, there
is a significant impact (with the expected sign) of having the possibil-
ity of working home. This measure has no differentiated effect on trips
made for a certain purpose. This finding corresponds with the results
presented in Table 5, in which effect sizes for the purposes are com-
parable. Respondents with a higher income are less price sensitive,
which is rather plausible. Finally, it appears that the compensation of
costs by employers is important for the self-reported effectiveness
of this measure, as with the previous measure.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented the results from a stated-preference survey
among Dutch car owners on behavioral responses to road pricing.
For trips, the effectiveness of the measures is in the range of 6% to
15% for all purposes. It is often difficult to compare these results
with previous literature because of differences in the measures ana-
lyzed and the research methods applied (modeling versus stated
preference). The work discussed here probably comes closest to the
research by MuConsult (6), although that study also included respon-
dents who did not own a car. The outcomes in terms of kilometers
for Measure 1A and 1B may be comparable to the results of the
TABLE 5 Estimation Results (Marginal Effects) of Tobit Analysis
with the Effectiveness of Measure 1 as Dependent Variable
Variable Tobit y Measure 1 Sign.
Constant −.048 (.315) *
Yearly driven number of kilometers −.374E-06 (.31E-06)
Age −.472E-03 (.45E-03)
Weekly number of times in congestion −.760E-03 (.45E-03)
Income (dummy inc1 = base)
Incunk (do not know or won’t say) −.119 (.048) **
Inc2 ( 62 8.500–45.000) .016 (.013)
Inc3 ( 645.000–68.000) .003 (.014)
Inc4 (>68.000) −.047 (.019) **
Type of measure 
(dummy charge 12 = base)
Dummy charge 3 6cent −.052 (.012) ***
Dummy charge 6 6cent −.033 (.012) ***
Type of measure 
(dummy road taxes = base)
Dummy income taxes .040 (.010) ***
Trip purpose 
(dummy other = base)
Dummy commuting −.062 (.014) ***
Dummy visiting .017 (.012)
Employed
Dummy yes −.023 (.012)
Possibility to work at home 
(dummy working home2 and 
working home3 = base)
Working home1 (possible) .027 (.013) **
Compensation for commuting costs 
(dummy comp4 = base)
Comp1 (no costs paid by employer) .026 (.019)
Comp2 (costs partly compensated) .035 (.015) **
Comp3 (full compensation) −.024 (.018)
Children in household (Yes = base)
No children −.021 (.010) **
N 1370
Log likelihood −713.946
NOTE: The standard errors are shown in brackets. *, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively (two-sided t-test).
MuConsult study. The results then show stronger effects, which
cannot be explained entirely by the fact that non-car owners were
not included. The effect in terms of kilometers is somewhat smaller;
probably people driving relatively less adjust their behavior.
A flat kilometer charge (Measure 1) may not have much effect on
commuting trips. When policy makers want to affect these types of
trips, they should consider a measure that is time differentiated, with
higher charges during peak hours (as in Measure 2). Nonmotorized
travel is a popular alternative for trips to visit people or shopping
trips, especially when it concerns a flat kilometer charge. This sug-
gests that people often take the car for short trips that can be most
easily replaced by walking or cycling. However, this sample
includes relatively few elderly for whom walking or cycling may not
always be an option. Driving at other times is also popular, espe-
cially for the car-dependent commuting trips. Commuting trips are
hard to reduce (working at home or not making the trip are not seri-
ous options for most of the respondents), but there appears to be
some level of flexibility allowing scheduling of trips.
The impact of the type of measure is not straightforward. Previ-
ous research and common sense suggest that higher kilometer
charges should have more impact. The results are somewhat mixed
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on this issue and are difficult to explain. The effect of revenue use
appears clear from the analysis: revenues allocated to lower-income
taxes generally have more effect (but not significantly different for
the peak–off-peak measure). This may be explained partly by the
“perceived” income effect, as it is caused by the design of the ques-
tionnaire. An estimate of the benefit from recycling could be calcu-
lated and shown to the respondent for car tax reductions but not for
income tax reductions.
The statistical analysis showed that charge level has a significant
impact for the flat charge, while only the difference between the high
and middle charge level is significant for the peak time measure. For
both measures, the possibility of working at home is an important
explanatory variable. People who have more flexibility tend to
change trips more frequently. Employed respondents appear rela-
tively unwilling to change trips. Higher-income people appear to be
less price sensitive, which appears rather plausible. Other charac-
teristics, such as age and the number of kilometers driven yearly,
tend to have a minor effect on the level of effectiveness.
Finally, it is hard to determine whether or not these results can be
generalized to other countries. For example, the availability (tran-
sit) and inherent popularity (cycling) of alternatives may differ
between countries; the spatial structure may be different, and many
other factors may cause further deviations. Although it is tempting
to present, for example, the conclusion on the importance of time
differentiation of charges for effectiveness in commuting as a more
general result, such conclusions cannot be drawn from this study and
therefore are left as material for further (local) study.
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TABLE 6 Estimation Results (Marginal Effects) of Tobit Analysis
with the Effectiveness of Measure 2 as Dependent Variable
Variable Tobit y Measure 2 Sign.
Constant −.035 (.045)
Yearly driven number of kilometers −.634E-06 (.47E-06)
Age −.884E-03 (.67E-03) **
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Income (dummy inc1 = base)
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Inc3 (645.000–68.000) −.017 (.021) **
Inc4 (>668.000) −.056 (.026)
Type of measure 
(dummy charge 24 = base)
Dummy peak charge 6 6 cent −.024 (.018) **
Dummy peak charge 12 6 cent −.039 (.018)
Type of measure 
(dummy road taxes = base)
Dummy income taxes .019 (.015)
Trip purpose (dummy other = base)
Dummy commuting .021 (.019)
Dummy visiting .027 (.018)
Employed
Dummy yes −.108 (.032) ***
Possibility to work at home 
(dummy working home2 and 
working home3 = base)
Working home1 (possible) .058 (.018) ***
Compensation for commuting costs 
(dummy comp4 and comp5 = base)
Comp1 (no costs paid by employer) .040 (.030) **
Comp2 (costs partly compensated) .058 (.024)
Comp3 (full compensation) .021 (.027)
Children in household (Yes = base)
No children .163E-02 (.015)
N 1370
Log likelihood −907.408
NOTE: The standard errors are shown in brackets. **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively (two-sided t-test).
